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Sabbatino Doctrine Modified in Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1964* 
[Vol. 63 
Prior to Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,1 one of the 
United States Supreme Court's most controversial recent decisions 
touching on matters of international law, it had been held that 
American courts could not question titles to property acquired by 
virtue of a public taking decreed by a recognized foreign government 
and carried out within its territory.2 This concept of judicial absten-
tion, embodied in the "act of state doctrine," was held applicable in 
Sab batino even though it was alleged that the asserted claim to the 
property stemmed from a confiscation3 that violated customary inter-
national law.4 This decision led Congress to incorporate into the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 a provision substantially modifying 
the rule laid down in Sabbatino.5 The Sabbatino Amendment for-
• Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 30l(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013. 
I. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See generally Comment, The Act of State Doctrine After 
Sabbatino, 63 MICH. L. REv. 528 (1965). 
2. E.g., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central 
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). See 
Comment, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1441 (1962); Note, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 234 (1960). 
This concept of judicial abstention is illustrated by the following example. Assume 
that P, a United States citizen, owned movable property located in country X and 
that the government of X confiscated his property without compensation and resold 
it to D. If D then brings the property into the United States and P initiates an action 
to recover it, the court would be precluded from questioning D's title once D has 
shown he acquired it in the course of the government-decreed confiscation. 
3. In its strictest sense, "confiscation" denotes a public taking of property without 
adequate compensation. See RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 12 
(1951). For the purposes of the present discussion, however, confiscation signifies a 
public taking for which less than full value compensation was paid or which allegedly 
violated international law. 
4. Customary international law refers to those principles which have derived their 
binding character from the fact' that civilized nations adhere to them even though they 
have never been formalized in agreements. It is distinguished from conventional inter-
national law, which is based on treaties or compacts between states. See generally 
BISHOP, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAw 23-35 (2d ed. 1962). The Court in Sabbatino 
suggested that a court might adjudicate a claim on the merits if it were contended that 
a particular confiscation violated conventional international law. 376 U.S. at 428. 
5. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 30l(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013: 
"[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall 
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination 
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which 
a claim of title or other right is asserted by any party including a foreign state 
(or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a 
confiscation in violation of the principles of international law, including the 
principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this sub-section: 
Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable (I) in any case in which 
an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or with respect to a 
claim of title or other right acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of 
not more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the 
confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the President 
determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that 
particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States and suggestion 
to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court, or (3) in any case 
in which the proceedings are commenced after January I, 1966." 
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bids American courts to refuse, under the act of state doctrine, to 
decide the merits of any claim of title or other rights asserted on the 
ground that a foreign confiscation contravened international law, 
which Congress defined to include the principle of full compensa-
tion.6 The statute affects only claims arising out of takings after Jan-
uary I, 19597 and only if suit is filed prior to January I, 1966.8 It 
does not apply to rights claimed under short-term letters of credit 
issued in good faith before the taking.9 Furthermore, the amend-
ment does not apply if the President notifies the court that the inter-
ests of American foreign relations require that it not inquire into 
the circumstances of the particular confiscation. 
The Sabbatino Amendment would seem clearly within the scope 
of congressional powers.10 Indeed, it is arguable that Congress has 
an inherent power to enact legislation on any subject which relates 
The statute only forbids courts to apply the "federal act of state doctrine." However, 
there is no longer room for an independent doctrine of international law applied by 
state courts. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 367 U.S. 398, 374-76 (1964). 
6. The "principles of compensation and ••. other standards" referred ,to in the 
amendment are included in previous legislation directing the President to suspend 
foreign assistance to any country that confiscates the property of United States citizens 
or corporations. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, § 30l(e), 77 Stat. 386, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2370(e) (Supp. V, 1964). The 1963 law contains many provisions which the authors of 
the amendment did not consider to be encompassed under the "principles and 
standards" clause. For example, it requires that the victim of the confiscation be a 
United States citizen or corporation and that the confiscating government be allowed 
six months to begin negotiations with the United States before foreign assistance is 
withdrawn. See llO CoNG. REc. 18946 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964). Apparently Congress 
merely intended to indicate by this phrase that an American court should not consider 
an expropriation by a foreign government to be legal unless compensation equivalent 
to the full value of the property taken has been paid or guaranteed or it is otherwise 
justified under international law. It is unclear whether full compensation is required 
by international law. See note 24 infra. 
7. The sponsors of the bill felt that some cutoff date was desirable; January I, 
1959 was chosen because it marked Castro's accession to power in Cuba and "the 
beginning of the greatest series of illegal takings of American property in recent 
history." llO CONG. REc. 18946 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964). 
8. The expiration date was included to provide the House of Representatives with 
an opportunity to hold full hearings on the legislation, after which Congress will 
consider adopting it on a permanent basis. H.R. REP. No. 1925, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 
16 (1964). 
9. "The exclusion from the scope of the amendment of attempts by the former 
owner of expropriated property to recover from the nationalized entity who had 
purchased after the taking but pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit issued prior 
thereto was inserted apparently in order to alleviate the opposition of at least one 
bank to the amendment." Metzger, Act of State Doctrine Refined-the Sabbatino Case, 
in THE SUPREME COURT REvlEw, 1964, at 223, 246 (Kurland ed.). 
IO. In Sabbatino, the Court said that the act of state doctrine, although not required 
by the Constitution, had "constitutional underpinnings." 376 U.S. at 423. The Court 
apparently meant that the separation of powers principle, which leaves questions of 
foreign policy in the hands of the political branches of the government, militates 
against deciding a case which could have an adverse effect on that policy when the 
political branches would prefer judicial abstention. It would be reading a great deal 
into the Court's statement to construe it as meaning that Congress could not modify 
the act of state doctrine. See Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts 
-Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 823 (1964). 
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to or affects our foreign relations.11 The sponsors of the amendment, 
however, conceived of it as an exercise of the specifically delegated 
powers to define and punish offenses against the law of nations and 
to regulate foreign commerce.12 It is doubtful that the law of nations 
clause is a sufficient delegation of power to support the amendment. 
The accounts of the Constitutional Convention suggest that Con-
gress was given authority to define offenses against the law of nations 
only to enable it to clarify the elements of particular crimes it in-
tended to punish.13 Moreover, the few cases decided under the law 
of nations clause indicate that Congress can deal with violations of 
international law only by imposition of criminal sanctions.14 The Sab-
batino Amendment, however, is civil rather than criminal. Further-
more, the question of how much compensation, if any, must be paid 
an alien whose property is taken is presently an unsettled issue in 
international law.15 However, given the purpose of the amendment 
to afford some protection to American foreign investors against con-
fiscations and to prevent the United States from becoming a ready 
market for confiscated goods, 16 the commerce clause provides suffi-
cient authority for its enactment.17 Moreover, the fact that the exec-
utive branch of our government is primarily responsible for the con-
duct of foreign relations need not in any way restrict the full 
exercise of those powers specifically granted to the legislative branch 
by the Constitution.18 
Although traces of the act of state doctrine can be found in 
11. See Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers-The Law of the Land 
and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 903, 922 (1959). Professor Henkin admits that 
the Court has never explicitly stated that Congress has such a broad inherent power, 
but he feels that the authority can be justified on the basis of the Court's language in, 
e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958); Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378 (1933); and 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). Another author, looking at the 
question from the viewpoint of American history, finds no reason for saying that any 
branch of the federal government has any inherent foreign affairs power. Patterson, 
In re the United States v. The Curtiss-Wright Corporation (pts. 1-2), 22 TEXAS L. REV. 
286, 445 (1944). 
12. See llO CONG. REc. 18946 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964). The Constitution provides: 
"The Congress shall have the Power ••• To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations 
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ••• To define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences Against the Law of 
Nations.'' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
13. See 2 MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 544-46, 725 (Scott ed. 
1898). But cf. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 115 (1917). 
14. See United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1886); United States v. White, 27 Fed. 
200 (C.C.ED. Mo. 1886). 
15. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-29 (1964); note 24 
infra. 
16. 110 CONG. REc. 18946 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964). 
17. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (suggesting the commerce clause can be made the basis of a 
sort of international police power). 
18. See generally CHEEVER & HAVILAND, AMERICAN FOREIGN PoUCY AND THE SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS (1952); CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT-OFFICE AND POWERS 207-74 (4th rev. ed. 
1957). 
May 1965] Recent Developments 1313 
Anglo-American decisions for three centuries,19 international law 
does not forbid a domestic court to question the legality of an act 
of a foreign state in the process of resolving a controversy othenvise 
within the jurisdiction of that court.20 Indeed, courts in several 
countries have adjudicated the merits of contentions that title to 
property was defective because it was acquired in the course of a 
confiscation which violated international law.21 It has often been 
suggested, moreover, that the law of nations would become a more 
potent force in the world community if domestic courts systemati-
cally attempted to develop and apply rules of international law to 
confiscation cases.22 On the other hand, several cogent policy con-
siderations favoring application of the act of state doctrine irrespec-
tive of an alleged international law violation appear in the Admin-
istration's position paper opposing the Sabbatino Amendment.23 
First, there is no firm international law rule regarding the responsi-
bility owed alien property-holders by a confiscating government.24 
19. Although Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), is regarded as the first 
case to have enunciated formally the act of state doctrine, much earlier courts had 
shown a reluctance to review the conduct of a foreign sovereign in his own territory. 
See, e.g., Blad v. Bamfield, 3 Swan. 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674). 
20. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964); 1 OPPENHEIM, 
INTERNATIONAL LAw § 115 (Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1955). 
21. E.g., Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 316 (Aden Sup. Ct.); 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R., [1955] Int'! L. Rep. 23 (Civil Ct. of Rome); Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kobuski Kaisha, [1953] Int'l L. Rep. 305 (High Ct. of 
Tokyo). Courts in some countries refuse to recognize a party's claim to property if it 
derives from a foreign confiscation violative of the public policy of the forum. See 
O'Connell, A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation, 4 INT'L &: CoMP. L.Q. 267, 267-68 
(1955) (discussing French, German and Swiss practice.) 
22. Goldie, The Sabbatino Case-International Law Versus the Act of State, 12 
U.C.L.A.L. R.Ev. 107 (1964); Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of its Func-
tions7, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946); Stevenson, The State Department and Sabbatino-
"Ev'n Victors Are by Victories Undone," 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 707 (1964). Possible advan-
tages of the application of international law by national courts are that domestic courts 
are convenient, respect for international law is strengthened when it, rather than 
diplomacy, is applied to problems, and the individual would be led to a greater aware-
ness that international law exists for his benefit. 
23. Hearings on Foreign Assistance Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 618-19 (1964). One frequently advanced reason why domestic 
courts should not apply international law to confiscation cases does not appear in the 
position paper. With courts in different countries deciding such cases and having no 
firm rules to guide them, one who buys confiscated property will not know where he 
can safely take it without being subject to an adverse judgment as to his title. See 
Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law-A Reply, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 141 
(1960). 
24. There is much disagreement regarding the amount of compensation that a 
government must pay aliens whose property is expropriated. Until fifty years ago the 
standard was clear: full, prompt, and effective compensation. See Re, The Nationaliza-
tion of Foreign-Owned Property, 36 MINN. L. R.Ev. 323 (1952). Most authors feel that 
some compensation is still necessary, even in takings arising out of today's social reform 
movements. E.g., Mann, International Delinquencies Before Municipal Courts, 70 
L.Q. R.Ev. 181, 188 (1954); Rubin, Nationalization and Compensation-A Comparative 
Approach, 17 u. CHI. L. R.Ev. 458, 460 (1950); see WORTLEY, ExPROPRIATI0N IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 34-35 (1959) (classifying the views of thirty-eight authors). One 
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Second, the matter of compensation for American investments lost 
through foreign confiscations is better resolved exclusively through 
diplomatic channels. Only in this way, the Administration argued, 
can the United States avoid the possible embarrassment that might 
arise from a court decision offensive to the confiscator or espousing 
a view on the legality of a given confiscation different from that pub-
licly announced by the State Department. Furthermore, negotiations 
may eventually be necessary to settle the claims of all United States 
nationals, not merely the few whose property happens to become the 
subject of litigation in American courts.25 
While these propositions might be persuasive if Congress had 
directed the courts to apply existing international law to every con-
fiscation case, the arguments lose much force when addressed to the 
actual Sabbatino Amendment. First, the amendment avoids the diffi-
cult and presently insoluble problem of finding an international law 
standard of compensation by substituting the full value rule for the 
uncertain criteria of the law of nations.26 Implicit in the concept of 
full compensation as used in the statute, of course, is the require-
ment that it be effective compensation,27 paid or at least guaranteed 
before a case involving the confiscated property comes to judgment. 
There is no reason to believe that Congress would be unwilling to 
amend the full compensation provision in the event that the inter-
national law position on the matter should become more clearly set-
tled at less than a full value level.28 Given the present posture of 
international law, however, it is difficult to maintain that our gov-
ernment is treating an assignee of confiscated property unjustly or 
author doubts that any compensation is necessary unless the owners have been invited 
to bring their property into the country. Friedmann, Some Impacts of Social Organiza• 
tion on International Law, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 502-06 (1956). 
25. The Administration's arguments are amplified in the Brief for the United States 
as Amicus Curiae, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), reprinted 
in 2 INT'L. LEG. MAT. 1009 (1963). 
26. See notes 5, 6 &: 24 supra. 
27. Compensation, although formally paid, may amount to nothing in fact. In the 
Cuban taking of American facilities, for example, "compensation" was rendered in the 
form of thirty year bonds paying 2% annual interest. The interest was noncumulative 
and was to be paid only if the United States purchased during the year more than three 
million Spanish tons of Cuban sugar at not less than five and three-quarters cents per 
English pound. In the ten years preceding the confiscation, the price of sugar purchased 
from Cuban sources never reached that level. Only in one of those years did the United 
States purchase more than three million Spanish tons. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 402 n.4 (1964). 
28. The other international law issues likely to arise in confiscation cases are fairly 
well settled. Examples of the settled doctrines are that a sovereign owes no international 
law duty to its own citizens and that a taking in accordance with an agreement with the 
owner's government is permissible irrespective of customary international law. See 
BRIERLY, LAw OF NATIONS 74-76 (4th ed. 1949); cf. Case of the S.S. "Wimbledon," 
P.C.l.J., ser. A, No. 1 (1923). If the defendant is an agency of the foreign government, 
there is the further question of the sovereign's possible immunity to suit. See generally 
63 MICH. L. REV. 708 (1965). 
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inequitably when it warns him to keep the property outside the 
United States unless he has good title within the meaning of the 
amendment. The rationale of the Administration's opposition to the 
Sabbatino Amendment is further weakened by the provision in 
the amendment giving the Administration unrestricted authority to 
invoke the act of state doctrine whenever the executive deems it ad-
visable in the interest of foreign relations.29 
Under the Sabbatino Amendment, the United States may be 
accused of discrimination if act of state immunity is invoked only 
in certain instances. The President may be called upon to de-
cide whether to preclude review of the merits of a case at a 
time when he would prefer to remain silent.30 Moreover, the 
amendment is unlikely to provide substantial protection for 
American investments abroad because little confiscated property 
will ever come within the jurisdiction of United States courts.31 
Nevertheless, the substantial merits of the Sabbatino Amend-
ment should not be overlooked. From the point of view of the 
Administration, the amendment is a nucleus around which a 
clear-cut policy can be formulated with full knowledge that the 
courts can be called upon to enforce it if confiscated property 
comes within their jurisdiction. For example, the Administra-
tion could announce its intention of invoking the act of state 
doctrine only if the confiscator enters into negotiation of a compen-
sation standard with the government of the former owner soon after 
the taking. At least one commentator has taken the position that the 
President should invoke the act of state doctrine whenever a confis-
cation case comes before a court.32 No matter how often the execu-
tive precludes review of the merits, however, the amendment has 
significant value in at least one respect: it directs each question in 
a confiscation case-the merits of a claim and the executive's interest 
in foreign relations-to that branch of the government most capable 
of evaluating it. If the conduct of our foreign relations requires the 
act of state doctrine as a barrier to hearing what might othenvise be 
an appropriate claim for relief, it is appropriate that those who de-
sign our foreign policy should assume the responsibility for invoking 
the doctrine. 
Because of the embarrassment othenvise possible in our foreign 
relations, the Admi~istration understandably prefers to have the act 
of state doctrine in force. It would probably prefer Congress to die-
29. See note 5 supra. If a foreigner seeks to rely on the Sabbatino Amendment in 
our courts the Administration would presumably wish to consult that person's govern-
ment before deciding whether to preclude judicial review. 
30. See Hearings on Foreign Assistance Before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 619 (1964). 
31. Id. at 618-19. 
32. See Metzger, supra note 9, at 247. 
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tate that, while the act of state doctrine remained in force generally, 
no court could refuse to consider the merits of a confiscation case if 
the executive requested adjudication.33 In any event, it is clear that 
the Eighty-ninth Congress, when it considers enacting the Sabbatino 
Amendment or a modified version thereof as permanent legislation, 
will be faced with a problem requiring intensive study and a deli-
cate balancing of conflicting interests. 
33. Compare Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat• 
schappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), reversing 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), where the 
court did go to the merits of a party's title to property, acquired as a result of a 
confiscation by the Nazi government, after receiving notice from the State Department 
that American policy was "to relieve American courts from any restraint upon the 
exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of acts of Nazi officials .••• " 
Ibid. The Supreme Court in Sabbatino expressly refused to pass on the validity of a 
court's hearing a case after receiving a Bernstein-type notice. 376 U.S. at 437. It is 
questionable whether the Court would uphold a case like Bernstein without a con-
gressional directive to do so. See Metzger, supra note 9, at 241. 
